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Contemporary Chinese middlebrow cinema
Ting Guo
Introduction
In the past decade, the theme of the middle class in Chinese cinema has 
attracted considerable attention from critics and scholars in China, focusing 
on the middle class either as the dominant narrative of contemporary Chinese 
f ilms or as the main audiences of Chinese cinema (see Duan 2007; Yang 2011; 
Zhang 2011). However, despite this increasing interest in this newly emergent 
middle-class culture in Chinese cinema, the term ‘middlebrow’ (中眉 zhongmei 
or 平眉 pingmei in Chinese)1 has been seldom discussed or used. I will argue 
that the caution that Chinese film scholars have shown in applying the con-
cept of middlebrow to the Chinese context is partly related to the porosity 
between the concepts of middlebrow culture and middle-class culture, and 
partly related to the ambivalent position that the new middle-class taste has in 
current Chinese cinematic culture, as this taste has itself been fostered in part 
by the state.
However, before we think middlebrow across borders, it is important to revisit 
the use of the term in its original context. Since its origin in Britain and Ireland, 
‘middlebrow’ has been persistently identified by literary critics, from F.R. Leavis 
and Q.D. Leavis (1932) to Virginia Woolf (1942) and Dwight Macdonald (1960), 
as a pejorative label for intellectually inferior cultural production, which vulgar-
izes and devalues high culture. Since the 1990s, this early hostility on the part 
of literary critics has been identified as an expression of contemporary anxieties 
about cultural authority and fear of cultural change (see Baxendale and Pawling 
1996; Rubin 2002; Brown and Grover 2012). As Erica Brown and Mary Grover 
also point out, ‘as a product of contested and precarious assertions of cultural 
authority, it (the middlebrow) is itself unstable’ and hard to define (2012, 2). 
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Moreover, the interpretation of so-called middlebrow tastes is often ambiguous 
and associated with a particular class or social group. As Lawrence Napper argues, 
in Woolf’s well-known but unsent letter to the New Statesman, she ‘displays in 
her contempt an interesting slippage between the aesthetics of middlebrow taste, 
and that section of the population who are deemed to possess it’ (2000, 117). 
Although Woolf (1942, 119) does not spell out who this middlebrow population 
is, her definition of middlebrow as being ‘betwixt and between’ and ‘neither art 
itself nor life itself, but both mixed indistinguishably, and rather nastily, with 
money, fame, power or prestige’ implies the link between middlebrow tastes and 
wealth and social class, particularly the emerging middle class in English society 
in the twentieth century.
This link between taste and class is later reinforced in Pierre Bourdieu’s sociol-
ogy of taste. In his influential Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste 
(1984), he analyses how taste is socially constructed and practised to differentiate 
one’s class from others. By analysing how the petite bourgeoisie attempts to dis-
tance itself from the working class, and the elite from both middle and working 
classes, through their cultural choices, Bourdieu highlights a symbolic hierarchy 
in the French cultural field as well as the relation between class and the forma-
tion of tastes. For Bourdieu, ‘what makes middle-brow culture (la culture moyenne) 
is the middle-class relation to culture – mistaken identity, misplaced belief, allo-
doxia’ (1984, 327). Whether the English translation ‘middlebrow culture’ is the 
equivalent of ‘la culture moyenne’ may still be debatable (Pollentier 2012, 38–41), 
but Bourdieu’s emphasis on the hierarchy of cultural legitimacies echoes Woolf’s 
definition of the middlebrow’s in-between position, and his configuration of the 
middlebrow as produced by a relationship to class encourages a vision of mid-
dlebrow tastes as a struggle for legitimacy carried out exclusively by the aspirant 
middle class. However, at the same time, this relational approach also suggests that 
tastes are not universal and the division of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture may be blurred 
and challenged when existing class relationships in a society are transformed by 
social mobility. The connections between social mobility, taste and culture have 
been noted and discussed in the context of film by scholars such as Napper (2000; 
2009) and Sally Faulkner (2013), who explore how the emergent new middle class 
influenced film in European contexts.
This chapter will discuss how middlebrow as a western category can be recon-
ceptualized in a Chinese context, as well as whether it may help us understand 
how Chinese film professionals address the new Chinese middle-class audience and 
what kind of discussions Chinese middlebrow cinema might open up. Due to limi-
tations of space, this chapter will only focus on middlebrow cinema in mainland 
China, although it is undeniable that both Hong Kong and Taiwanese cinemas 
have exerted significant influence on its development, and it is sometimes hard 
to divide them due to the increased collaboration among film professionals in the 
three territories.
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Film and middlebrow culture in China
Film as a mass entertainment
The earliest application of the term ‘middlebrow’ to the Chinese context is Liu 
Ts’un-yan’s discussion of Chinese fiction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.2 Ts’un-yan discusses the problems of applying the term middlebrow to 
the analysis of Chinese fiction. He argues that it itself implies ‘a scale of judgment 
of both book and reader, evolved within the Western literary context’, and is 
problematic to apply to Chinese examples without adjustments, particularly given 
the fact that novel and fiction were not considered as a literary genre by traditional 
Chinese intellectuals before the late nineteenth century (1984, 2). He even suggests 
its application might devalue ‘Chinese models of excellence’, distorting the ‘very 
concept of excellence’ in its original setting; therefore, different gradations have to 
be applied when evaluating Chinese literature with this term (1984, 2). Ts’un-yan’s 
use of the term ‘middlebrow’ has been challenged by W.L. Idema (1986). Idema 
finds Ts’un-yan’s consideration of ‘Chinese middlebrow fiction as products of so-
called middle-class culture’ problematic, as Chinese fictions produced at the turn 
of the century did not address or constitute a middle-class culture, but responded 
to ‘the most demanding literary circles of their day’ (1986, 114). For Idema, unless 
there is a ‘demonstrable emergence of a large, internally segmented reading public 
of which each segment is serviced by a more or less clearly demarcatable body of 
publications’, the term ‘middlebrow’ ought to be avoided.
The caution Idema advises is understandable because re-grading Chinese 
artistic and literary works according to an Anglophone scale is tricky. However, 
his insistence that ‘a large, internally segmented reading public’ served by a 
clearly defined body of publications must exist in China before the term is 
conferred might also risk stereotyping and homogenizing middlebrow tastes. 
Nonetheless, Ts’un-yan does make a valid point about the involvement of 
subjective evaluation of quality and historical contingency in defining the 
middlebrow in different cultures. This is particularly relevant to this chapter’s 
discussion of Chinese middlebrow cinema, because film, as initially an imported 
cultural medium in China, has been constantly redefined and deployed by 
different social and political powers over the course of China’s social and politi-
cal revolutions and reforms in the past century. This history, without doubt, 
affects the ways in which culture, film and class have been intertwined and 
have affected each other in China, and needs to be taken into account when we 
discus s Chinese middlebrow films.
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 
the state has maintained a tight grip on culture in mainland China in part because 
of its effective policy-making, and in part because of the strength of native cul-
tural expectations about the nature and uses of cultural products such as film 
(Zhu and Nakajima 2010, 33). For a relatively long time Chinese film was the 
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state’s mouthpiece for ideology and instrument for inculcation. As Yingjin Zhang 
observes, between 1949 and 1978, Chinese cinema was ideologically dominated 
by ‘CCP [Chinese Communist Party]-codified class consciousness’ (2004, 203). 
During this period, Chinese cinema underwent significant changes compared to 
the pre-socialist period to legitimize the CCP’s political hegemony in China. For 
example, in 1953, China’s Film Bureau held two meetings and identified ‘socialist 
realism’ as the highest standard in film production for Chinese film professionals. 
The manner and lifestyles of petit-bourgeois intellectuals and elites were con-
sidered dangerous to the Party’s leadership and the ongoing socialist revolution. 
Films produced during this period focused on figures identified with the revo-
lutionary masses, such as workers, peasants and soldiers, and promoted public 
welfare and collective interest over individual fulfilment (Zhang 2004, 203). For 
this relatively long period, 1949–78, Chinese cinema stigmatized and ridiculed, 
rather than inheriting or promoting, the country’s traditional emphasis on fine 
manners, proper speech and knowledge of classic literature, which was once pos-
sessed by the elites. Although the situation has gradually changed since the 1980s, 
when China launched its economic reforms and tentatively opened up, allowing 
filmmakers to enjoy more freedom, the history of film as a form of mass entertain-
ment and political inculcation in China has had an undeniable impact on both the 
public and film critics’ perception and evaluation of the medium, consequently 
affecting the formation of middlebrow culture in Chinese cinema.
Similar problems have been addressed by scholars such as Yi Zheng (2014), 
who analyses the reappearance of taste and class culture in current Chinese society, 
particularly in print media, and points out that both writers and publishing houses 
participate in a process of constructing a post-socialist civility to support a project 
of building a harmonious and affluent society proposed by the Party-state. Zheng 
argues that class is ‘seldom a descriptive category of structural social change in 
China’ and its use is often ‘contingent and fraught with conceptual contradictions 
and political tensions’ (2014, 5). For her, the cultivation and practice of taste in 
post-socialist China is ‘a state-sponsored discourse, feeding into the discourse of 
economic development and its offspring – the harmonious society’ (Zheng 2014, 9). 
In this process, a prominent problem is the ‘lack of awareness of and understand-
ing of taste and the need for distinction’ among a ‘Chinese newly made or yet to 
be made middleclass’, which comes about owing to ‘a history of material scarcity 
and social-aesthetic crassness based on a false promise of equality’ in socialist China 
(Zheng 2004, 103). Although this seeming ‘lack of awareness and understanding 
of taste’ might be more complicated than Zheng argues, and ‘the Chinese newly 
made or yet to be made middleclass’ is a rather wide and obscure social group that 
needs to be clarified, her argument about how social and political movements have 
changed China’s long tradition of cultivating cultural and aesthetic distinction is 
useful for us to understand that film has always been closely associated with popular 
culture in China and that this has affected the nature and development of Chinese 
middlebrow cinema.
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Middlebrowness in Chinese popular cinema
Despite Chinese cinema’s focus on a mass audience, since the early 1980s, a 
group of internationally renowned, highbrow or art-house Chinese film direc-
tors, particularly the fifth-generation directors, led by Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige 
and Tian Zhuangzhuang, has emerged. However, the Chinese film industry as a 
whole experienced a serious financial crisis when it underwent economic reform 
in this period, and had to resort to popular entertainment for films to survive. 
The reform abolished the state quota for production and the guaranteed pur-
chase system established in the 1950s. Apart from some so-called ‘leitmotif films’ 
(主旋律电影 Zhuxuanlü dianying), which are particularly selected and subsidized 
by the government to commemorate major historical and political events and pro-
mote national pride or a certain ideology among the public, the majority of films 
produced in China now have to face the pressure of the market. On the one hand, 
this commercialization of the film industry opens up possibilities for producers to 
explore different genres and more diverse themes; on the other hand, this pressure 
also forces them to take into account the market. Thus far producers have favoured 
a mass-centred cinema, which consequently undermines the position of art-house 
films in Chinese cinema.
At the same time, despite a reduction in state subsidies, the government 
maintains its grip on the production and exhibition in mainland China through 
censorship. Films on controversial subjects often may be denied production licenses 
or be banned. This discourages private companies or independent producers from 
investing in films that might not please the authorities. As Rui Zhang (2008, 74) 
points out, since the end of the 1990s, more and more independent filmmakers, 
who used to produce underground artistic or socially critical films and target inter-
national film festivals, including Jia Zhangke, Lou Ye and Wang Xiaoshuai, began 
to collaborate with the state or commercial film studios and try to gain access to 
the domestic market and appeal to domestic audiences. However, it is important to 
note that the new masses targeted by post-socialist Chinese cinema are a predomi-
nantly urban population, particularly the emerging middle class, rather than the 
previous revolutionary masses mainly composed of peasants, soldiers and workers. 
In contrast with the many art-house films of the 1980s, which focused on exotic 
rural subject matter, the mainstream of the Chinese film industry has now gradually 
shifted its focus to the country’s burgeoning urban culture. This is attributable to 
recent urbanization as well as government subsidies for building modern screening 
facilities in cities. According to statistics recently released by institutions such as the 
China Film Association, the State Administrator of Press, Publication, Radio, Film 
and Television and the Beijing Film Academy, the composition of Chinese film 
audiences has changed significantly: now young and middle-aged ‘white collar’ 
workers in urban areas are emerging as the principal cinema audience (Yang 2011, 
7). It might be misleading to think these statistics represent a full picture of audi-
ences, as the surveys generating these statistics were conducted mainly in large and 
medium-sized cities. However, the fact that all these surveys focus on urban areas 
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also shows that it is to the new urban middle class that current Chinese cinema 
primarily addresses itself.
Another underlying factor attributed to this new urban focus is the prevalent 
discourse on the new Chinese middle class in current Chinese society. Since the 
early 2000s, many scholars and public commentators have debated the definition 
of the ‘middle class’ in a Chinese context, its existence and (if such a social group 
does exist) its potential social and cultural roles.3 From as early as the beginning 
of the 1990s, this question has been frequently aired on Chinese media, although 
the actual term ‘middle class’ was rarely mentioned. Instead, a new word, xiuxian 
(休闲, leisure), was coined and widely used to describe a so-called ‘middle-class’ 
taste associated with modern urban life (replacing the previous, ideologically 
charged word, zichan jieji (资产阶级, bourgeois). At the same time this new word 
became a fashionable label to attach to various commercial products, from clothes 
to holiday resorts. This early emphasis on ‘middle-class’ taste and consumerism 
in Chinese mass culture and media, according to Jinhua Dai (1999, 219), is not 
the result of real cultural demands in Chinese society, but is a neoliberal con-
struction to stimulate consumerism. Dai’s argument has been echoed by Chinese 
film critics such as Huiyu Zhang (2011) and Liu Yang (2011). Zhang argues, for 
example, that although China is far from a middle-class society, narratives about 
the middle class have now become mainstream and shared by all social classes 
(2011, 20). She points out that mainstream films have now positioned themselves 
as part of middle-class culture, and shifted their focus from explicit criticism of 
society, or glorification of the Party and heroic representation of historical events, 
to wider themes emphasizing humanistic virtues such as self-sacrifice, hard work 
and loyalty (2011, 24). However, this new trend of middle-class tastes has also 
encountered criticism. Liu Yang (2011), for instance, analyses the image of the 
Chinese middle class in recently released commercial popular films such as 杜拉
拉升职记 / Go Lala Go! (2010, Xu) and 非诚勿扰 / If You Are The One I and 
II (Feng 2008 and 2010) to argue that they are often emulations of middle-class 
lifestyle in developed western countries, and are used as tools to encourage the 
public’s further consumption, and to cater to the urban nouveaux riches’ need to 
identify and consolidate their social status (Yang 2011, 9). For her, these films, 
which are imbued with so-called middle-class aesthetics, will only undermine 
the production of high-quality artistic works or popular films that address prob-
lems in Chinese society, and they will eventually lose their market share (2011, 
8–10). These criticisms, on the one hand, reveal Chinese film professionals’ anxi-
ety about the commercialization of the film industry, as well as the new social 
and economic role of film in Chinese society; on the other hand, they also reflect 
their ambivalent attitude towards an emerging middlebrow cinematic culture. 
Rather than adopt these broad-stroke negative criticisms of the middlebrow, I 
argue that the increasingly commercialized film industry has not only blurred the 
divisions between artistic and populist works, but also provides opportunities for 
its audience, be it upper, middle or working class, to transform and participate 
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in a cinematic culture that is more inclusive and dialectic. Thus the open term 
‘middlebrow’, rather than the class-bound ‘middle-class tastes’, is preferable. In 
the following sections I will analyse two films, If You Are The One (Feng 2008) 
and 让子弹飞 / Let The Bullets Fly (Wen 2010), to argue that Chinese mid-
dlebrow cinema simultaneously takes on a populist guise and explores a middle 
road between explicit social criticism and public entertainment. While satisfying 
some viewers’ curiosity about and aspiration for an upper-middle-class lifestyle, 
these middlebrow films also try to engage educated viewers through interrogating 
social problems, such as justice and cultural identity, caused by increasing social 
stratificatio n and commercialization.
Wealth, taste and justice: revisiting Chinese middlebrow 
cinema
What can wealth bring?: Feng Xiaogang and his New Year  
film, If You Are The One (2008)
Despite Chinese film critics’ contempt for middlebrow tastes, films depicting mid-
dle-class urban life are often blockbusters in China. They are popular because they 
not only provide a venue for many viewers, particularly the lower middle class, 
to observe an imagined, desirable upper-middle-class lifestyle, but also strike a 
chord by exposing the problems encountered by the nouveaux riches despite their 
wealth. A good example of this contrast between film professionals and viewers’ 
responses is one of Xiaogang Feng’s New Year films, If You Are The One (2008).4 
This romantic comedy made 325 million RMB (around 32.5 million GBP) and 
became the box-office champion that year. Its sequel, If You Are The One II (2010), 
was also a notable success, with a revenue of approximately 474 million RMB 
(47.4 million GBP). Given the limited space of this chapter, I will focus on the 
first film, If You Are The One, and discuss its depiction of an imagined middle-class 
lifestyle in China on the one hand, and, on the other, its satire of the nouveaux 
riches to entertain the mass audience.
Starring You Ge (from mainland China) and Qi Shu (from Taiwan), the film 
depicts a romantic story between a single, middle-aged Chinese man (Qin Fen, 
played by Ge) who returns to China after many years abroad, and a young and 
beautiful air stewardess who has been hurt in an extramarital affair (Liang Xiaoxiao, 
played by Shu). At the very beginning, the film ridicules the wealth of Chinese 
nouveaux riches by showing how Qin became a millionaire by selling an ‘inno-
vative invention’ to a stupid, but rich, venture capitalist: a ‘Conflict Resolution 
Terminal’ that is a plastic tube to cover people’s hands when they are playing 
rock-paper-scissors to prevent cheating! In the following scenes, the film shows 
how the newly rich Qin puts an advertisement online to look for true love and has 
blind dates with many strange applicants before meeting Liang, including a former 
male friend who is now homosexual; a cemetery saleswoman who tries to sell him 
plots in a graveyard; a pregnant single mum; an erotophobic widow; and a stock 
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trader who sees choosing a partner as buying stocks. These dating scenes follow 
the usual humorous and satirical style of Feng’s films. The dialogue between Qin 
and his dates is snappy and sarcastic, mocking the match-making that is prevalent 
in contemporary China, as well as evolving notions of marriage and romance in 
an increasingly materialistic society. Liang, who is still suffering from her previous 
relationship, meets with Qin under pressure from her parents. Neither Liang nor 
Qin think they will be a fit, but they end up having a drink together and confid-
ing their painful experiences in relationships to each other, thinking that after 
this they will never meet each other again anyway. But they soon meet again by 
accident. Then, attracted by Liang, Qin pursues her. Liang seems to be moved by 
Qin’s persistence but is undecided. She asks Qin to take her to Hokkaido, Japan, 
where she has romantic memories about her previous lover, and attempts suicide 
by jumping into the sea from a cliff. But Liang does not die and the film ends with 
her recovering in a wheelchair, accompanied by Qin, having decided to start a new 
life. This happy ending echoes the atmosphere of the Chinese New Year Festival 
when the film was screened, and the string of satirical jokes in the dialogue make 
this romantic comedy entertaining.
However, as many viewers and critics point out, this light-hearted urban com-
edy is also packed with commercials for brand-name commodities, from the laptop 
that Qin uses to place his advertisement to the drink that Qin and Liang have on 
their first date and the car that they drive. As Shuyu Kong observes, ‘Feng’s 
films on the one hand satirize urban China’s uneasy rush toward materialism and 
capitalism, but on the other hand ironically turn themselves into a dazzling brand-
name catalogue for contemporary Chinese consumers’ (2009, 158). Therefore, 
many film critics (Sha 2005; Ni 2006) consider Feng’s films, despite – or perhaps 
because of –their box-office success, to be lacking in artistic value and depth 
compared to art films made by independent filmmakers and Sixth-Generation 
directors. Their concerns over the encroachment of commoditization in Chinese 
cinema and criticism of Feng’s pandering to the taste of mass audiences mirror 
the impact that China’s economic boom has exerted on the film industry as well 
as critics’ contempt for middlebrow tastes in general. Other critics, such as Rui 
Zhang (2008, 141–2), try to justify Feng’s compromise between profit-making 
and artistic pursuit. She stresses, first, the pressures from investors and sponsors in 
an increasingly profit-driven film industry, and highlights, second, Feng’s strategy 
of burying social criticism for a more sophisticated audience under absurd and 
hilarious plots and dialogue.
As the first mainland Chinese film director to adapt the popular Hong Kong 
New Year film for a mainland Chinese audience,5 Feng has been a very success-
ful commercial film director. A recurring theme in many of his urban films is 
the humble living conditions of ordinary people and their striving for a better 
life in an increasingly materialist society, highlighting their resilience, virtue and 
admirable personality. Examples include Han Dong, a bus driver in 没完没了/ 
Sorry Baby! (1999), You You, an unemployed camera man in 大腕 / A Big Shot’s 
Funeral (2001), and Wang Li and Wang Bo, a thief couple in 天下无贼 / A World 
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Without Thieves (2005). Although in If You Are The One (2008) the privileged 
social stratum is still the target that Feng mocks and satirizes, his focus has clearly 
shifted from characters at the bottom of the social scale to the new middle class. 
In this film, Qin is a millionaire with years of overseas living experience, who 
does not need to worry about money or go to work every day; Liang is a young, 
pretty air stewardess, which in China commands a handsome salary and respect-
able social status. In the film, they meet in various places, including a tastefully 
furnished restaurant, an elegant tea house and a picturesque private members’ 
club. Clearly these places are carefully selected to depict the refined lifestyle of 
the Chinese upper middle class. Qin and Liang’s trip to scenic Hokkaido is not 
only the climax of the film, but also the culmination of this showcasing of a 
stylish middle-class life. Using many bird’s-eye-view shots, the film traces Qin 
and Liang’s journey in an SUV against the breathtaking beauty of Hokkaido. 
For Liang, this journey and her attempted suicide are a breakaway from her 
past; for Qin, this journey is a romantic start of his new relationship with Liang 
(see Figure 7.1). Although this tie-in for the Hokkaido local tourist industry has 
been scorned by viewers,6 Hokkaido’s peaceful and exotic scenery does fit well 
with the romantic theme of the film, and echoes the recent trend of overseas 
tours among the newly affluent Chinese. With expanded urbanization and com-
mercialization, leisure travel is no longer simply a way temporarily to escape 
from cities, but has now also become a consumer choice to display wealth and 
taste. Overseas leisure travel, in particular, becomes a conspicuous, aspirational 
form of consumption for many. According to a report by the Hokkaido local 
authority, the number of Chinese tourists staying near Lake Akan in Hokkaido, 
where the film was shot, jumped from 1,401 in 2008 to 10,221 in 2009 as an 
effect of this film (Hokkaido Bureau of Economy Trade and Industry 2011, 56). 
Clearly, despite some of the audience’s contempt for the commercial side of the 
film, some of its elements speak to filmgoers’ expectations and exert impact on 
the market (the Chinese overseas travel industry in this case).
FIGURE 7.1  If You Are the One (Feng 2008): Liang (Qi Shu) sits in the back of an 
SUV on her trip to Hokkaido with Qin (You Ge)
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In this vein, If You Are The One has been successful in securing its sponsor and 
audience at the same time, although this success does not mean that audiences are 
taken in. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno note, ‘The triumph of adver-
tising in the culture industry is that consumers feel compelled to buy and use its 
products even though they see through them’ (1973, 167). After all, the mass urban 
audience that Feng aims at is not necessarily people who have the ability to copy 
the upper-middle-class lifestyle depicted. For this type of audience, an enjoyable 
two-hour film can be a temporary relief from mundane life. Back to reality where 
they have to strive to make ends meet, many will also be as cynical as the above-
mentioned film critics with regards to the so-called middle-class lifestyle. This is 
probably why, in this film, Feng tries to offer an easily digestible depiction, but, 
at the same time, tries to appeal to the mass audience through multiple humorous 
jibes at the rich. This apparent paradox in the film constitutes a good example of an 
emerging Chinese middlebrow cinema responding to the expanded lower middle 
class in contemporary China. If, as discussed above, the Chinese media has created 
a middle-class culture to support the nation’s economic reform and the state’s con-
struction of a middle-class civility, this culture is now also shaping the Chinese film 
industry, which then generates new forms and content to adapt to the community 
that is thought to be consuming these products. The expansion of the Chinese 
lower middle class and their consumption choices have inevitably affected Chinese 
middlebrow culture, which has translated into a film industry that seeks to deliver 
a combination of commercial appeal and high production values.
Dislocating justice: Let The Bullets Fly (Wen 2010)
At first view, Let The Bullets Fly (2010) may seem an odd choice in this discussion 
of the middlebrow. Set in a small town in remote western China in the 1920s, the 
film tells the story of a group of bandits led by Pocky Zhang (Jiang Wen, also the 
director) and their conflict with Huang Silang, a local warlord and opium dealer 
(Chow Yun-Fat). Zhang and his gang derail a train and hijack Ma Bangde (Ge 
You), the new County Governor of Goose Town, and his wife (Carina Lau). 
To save himself, Ma tells Zhang that he is only the advisor of the Governor, and 
the real Governor, who purchased his post, died when the train crashed. Ma also 
persuades Zhang to disguise himself as the new Governor of Goose Town, with 
Ma as his private advisor, promising that he will help Zhang make a fortune in a 
short time through receiving bribes and squeezing local people. However, when 
Zhang and his gang arrive at Goose Town, they immediately find that the whole 
town is in fact under the control of Huang Silang, a ruthless crime warlord liv-
ing in a fortified citadel. Despite being a bandit, Zhang is not really interested in 
bullying the poor. He begins to develop a social conscience and tries to establish 
order and justice in Goose Town, which undermines Huang’s power and control. 
Zhang and Huang end up in a tug of war over the control of the town involving 
gunplay, thievery, disguise, double-spying and various outlandish stratagems, while 
the townspeople take a wait-and-see attitude, and prepare to switch allegiances to 
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the winning side. At the end, Zhang puts up a show of attacking Huang’s citadel 
and makes the locals believe that Huang has been beheaded. The locals then follow 
Zhang and break into Huang’s citadel and force Huang to commit suicide.
This is an entertaining action comedy, then, with abundant dark and coarse 
humour satirizing corruption, revolution and public indifference, as well as slap-
stick comedy. Its gunplay and chases are spectacular and full of energy. Its director, 
Jiang Wen, a popular actor turned art-house director, is well known for the dark 
humour and theatricality of his films, although they also have a reputation of not 
being accessible to the public. Compared to previous art films that he directed, 
阳光灿烂的日子 / In the Heat of the Sun (1994) and 鬼子来了 / Devils on the 
Doorstep (2000), Let The Bullets Fly (2010) seems to be more accessible and, indeed, 
it became the highest-grossing domestic movie in Chinese history, with profits of 
around 664 million RMB (around 66.4 million GBP). All this seems a far cry from 
the new middle-class and middlebrow culture discussed above. However, what is 
interesting about this film is not the fact that it became a blockbuster, but the fact 
that it attracted so much considered attention from both the public and critics that 
it inspired a collective interpretation. As Shelley Kraicer (2011) notes, this film 
‘connected with audiences and critics in an unprecedented way, earning a kind of 
across-the-board critical and public acclaim’ that one seldom sees in China. It is this 
contribution to considered public debate – which is remarkably politically critical, 
given continued censorship – that I identify as middlebrow.
While critics have tended to focus on the narratives and characters of Let The 
Bullets Fly, the public, whose views are expressed on fan sites and blogs,7 has been 
interested in exploring more sensitive areas, in particular the film’s subtly satirical 
symbols and political allegories. For example, the scene of a train compartment 
pulled by horses, which appears at the beginning and end, is regarded as a meta-
phor for China as a modernizing country driven by outdated ideology, because 
the phrase ‘horse-train’, pronounced as ‘ma-lie’ in Chinese, is also the shorthand 
for Marxism-Leninism in Chinese. The masks that Zhang and the other bandits 
wear, which are decorated with patterns of Mah-jong from one dot to nine dots, 
筒子 (tongzi, with a similar pronunciation to tongzhi, comrade), have also been 
interpreted as a symbol that indicates that Zhang’s group is made up of the real 
representatives of the Chinese masses, just as Mah-jong is considered the quintes-
sence of Chinese culture. The name of the town, 鹅城 (e-cheng, Goose Town), 
and the repeated appearance of the image of geese, are seen as an allegory of 
China dominated by the ideology of the Soviet Union period, because not only 
is the map of China similar to the shape of a bird, but the character 鹅 (e, goose) 
has the same pronunciation as俄 (e, an abbreviation of 苏俄 [su’e Soviet Union]). 
The above interpretations have been widely circulated in the public domain, par-
ticularly online, and have stimulated, in turn, further creative readings of the film, 
from the script and the objects used in the mise en scène to the names of characters 
and specific scenes.8 Despite the film producer’s insistence that the film is just for 
entertainment, and has no political agenda (Guo 2011), it seems that the director 
deliberately planted clues in the story for the audience to follow.
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For example, the film repeatedly stresses the idea of ‘公平’ (justice), especially 
through the character Zhang. The first time is when Zhang has just entered Goose 
Town as the new governor, and decides to reinstate the drum in the county court 
for the public to report their grievances. Zhang claims that ‘I am going to give 
justice to everyone. The drum for grievances cannot just be a decoration. It should 
let everyone voice their grievances and then return justice to the public’.9 The 
second time is when he tries to distribute money taken from the rich to the locals 
and mobilize them. Seeing the locals kowtowing, Zhang fires a gunshot into the air 
and shouts, ‘Stop kneeling! The emperors are gone, no one is worth your kneeling! 
I’m not worth your kneeling! I came to Goose Town for three things only: justice, 
justice, justice!’ (see Figure 7.2).10 The third mention of justice is connected to the 
death of Liu Zi, who is Zhang’s foster son and also the youngest member of his gang. 
Hu Wan, one of Huang’s henchmen, accuses Xiao Liu of eating two bowls of rice 
noodles but only paying for one. To escalate the dispute, Hu shouts, ‘Just because 
you are the son of the governor, you ate an extra bowl of noodles without having 
paid for it. This is unfair. We want justice, justice!’.11 Eventually the argument forces 
Liu Zi to resort to hara-kiri to prove his innocence before dropping dead. However, 
despite these repetitions, the film does not explore further the idea of ‘justice’ other 
than as revenge, but slyly propels viewers to seek and interpret the signs of ‘injus-
tice’: from the six official titles that Ma buys to Huang and his henchmen’s bullying 
of the locals and the locals’ indifference and apathy in the noodle shop. These 
suggested scenes have been seized upon by viewers and widely discussed on fan 
sites, further stimulating analysis of the film. Jiang Fangzhou, a well-known Chinese 
writer and also the associate editor of News Weekly, writes in her Weibo account 
(China’s Twitter-like microblogging service): ‘The success of this film is attribut-
able to the fact that Jiang made everyone feel flattered, thinking the film speaks 
for them: fans of Mao Zedong can see the shadow of Mao; fans of the US see the 
image of Washington; reformists see reform; revolutionists see revolution; populists 
see populism; “the rabble” find their saviour; and the SAPPRFT12 reads in it the 
FIGURE 7.2  Let the Bullets Fly (Wen 2010): Zhang (Jiang Wen) announces: ‘I came to 
Goose Town for three things only: justice, justice, justice!’
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message of the glorified Party’ (2010).13 As Jiang suggests, the commercial success 
of this film, and the fact that it was not censored by China’s State Administration 
of Radio, Film and Television, is largely because Wen skilfully blends slapstick and 
satire to accommodate multiple interpretations, while carefully toeing the Party’s 
political line. The fact that a film mocking ‘justice’ is so successful across the country 
indicates that injustice remains an urgent question in contemporary China. Thus 
while If You Are The One is middlebrow in its portrayal and critique of middle-class 
consumption, swashbuckling popular comedy Let The Bullets Fly is uninterested in 
the middle-class consumption that the Party seeks to promote. Rather, it is mid-
dlebrow as it fuses accessible entertainment with the serious matter of exposing 
injustice. An analysis of the considerable online comments generated by the film 
reveal a literate and considered – and political – response to it on the part of viewers 
that audience studies have shown to be newly urban and middle class.
In 2011, well-known journalist Zhongxiao Guo published an article titled ‘Let 
The Bullets Fly Sets Off a Carnival of Political Allegory’ as the cover story of the 
Hong Kong-based magazine Asia Weekly. He suggested that although viewers’ 
interpretations might distort the original intention of this film, and weaken the 
exploration of its value, they are also reflections of prevailing social concerns and 
expressions of surging public feelings. Although Guo does not make clear what 
kind of value may be undermined, his observation regarding viewers’ excitement 
in deciphering the content of the film rather than its artistic form is timely. As he 
notes, Let The Bullets Fly serves as an outlet for viewers to articulate their views 
on the reality of contemporary China. Film viewing is no longer, if indeed it ever 
was, simply the passive consumption of products, but rather an activity that allows 
viewers to participate in refined cultural discourses. Film interpretation therefore 
becomes a social act for educated viewers to distinguish themselves from ordi-
nary filmgoers who are merely seeking two hours of entertainment, although their 
interpretations are mainly based on content rather than form, due to their limited 
familiarity with the vocabulary of the field. Within the constraints imposed by 
censorship, it is also a tentatively political act.
This engagement of the educated middle-class viewer is subtly changing the 
Chinese film industry. In Susan Sontag’s words, this kind of interpretation ‘tames 
the work of art’ and makes it more ‘manageable, conformable’ (1994, 8). When 
Wen was asked to comment on the box-office failure of his film 太阳照样升起 
/ The Sun Also Rises (2007), he claimed that it ‘was not made to be understood, 
but to move the audience’ (quoted in Liu 2010). However, in an interview with 
Times magazine, he joked that Let The Bullets Fly ‘would be hard not to understand 
this time’ (quoted in Liu 2010). Jiang’s statement shows that Chinese film profes-
sionals, including art-house cinema directors, are gradually shifting from public 
political cultivation and moral education to fostering and satisfying a broad-based 
popular, but intelligent, audience. The strong response from Chinese viewers to 
the political allegories in the film shows that Chinese middlebrow culture is not 
simply an imitation of the west, a complaint one often sees about the new Chinese 
middle classes’ consumption of imported luxury products to mimic the lifestyle of 
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the middle class in the west. Instead, the aggravated economic disparities and new 
social-political tensions resulting from China’s economic reforms have exerted a 
significant impact on the aspirant and affluent new middle class as well as the bur-
geoning middlebrow culture in China.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that China’s longstanding emphasis on inclusiveness and 
political conformity in state-funded art has undermined the cultivation of distinction 
and aesthetics in Chinese cinema, and made film not only a mass entertainment, but 
also a tool of political inculcation and moral education. However, China’s economic 
reform and urbanization in the past decades has forced its film industry to adjust its 
policy and focus on the urban audience, particularly the affluent new middle class. 
This new urban focus in fact echoes the new prevailing discourse about middle-
class civility supported by the state and the cultural industry. However, it also poses 
problems and challenges to Chinese film professionals due to market pressures and 
the enlarging but also increasingly stratified middle class. On the one hand, the nou-
veaux riches have to face the pressure of justifying their social status as well as cultural 
identity in a society still dominated by a mass culture that emphasizes equality rather 
than distinction. On the other, the division between middlebrow and lowbrow is 
increasingly blurred due to the expansion of the lower middle class in China, whose 
members have high educational backgrounds. All this makes it difficult to talk about 
a middlebrow culture as separate from mass culture in China. Films such as If You Are 
The One and Let The Bullets Fly are good examples of how filmmakers try to appeal 
to the masses and engage the new educated middle-class audience at the same time. 
Although these two films have very different styles, both of them address problems 
and issues that preoccupied the middle class during China’s social and economic 
transformations. In this sense, Chinese middlebrow cinema plays a mediating role in 
addressing the cultural anxiety of the new middle class, and at the same time provides 
a substitute for their pursuit of distinction in reality.
Notes
 1 中眉 (zhongmei) is the literal translation of the word ‘middlebrow’ into Chinese 
(zhong: middle; mei: brow); while the term 平眉 (pingmei), although it retains the literal 
translatio n of ‘brow’, replaces the idea of ‘middle’ with 平 (ping: ‘flat’, ‘equal’, ‘at the 
same level’).
 2 This was published in the introduction of a special issue of Renditions (17/18, 1982), 
then re-published as an edited book, Chinese Middlebrow Fiction, From the Ch’ing and Early 
Republican Eras in 1984.
 3 For more information on this discussion, see Lu (2002), Li (2009), Zhou (2005) and Yan 
(2008).
 4 Feng Xiaogang is a renowned commercial film director as well as a successful script 
writer and TV drama director in China. Apart from the film If You Are The One (2008) 
and its sequel (2010), he also directed films such as A Sign (2000), Cell Phone (2003), 
A World Without Thieves (2004), The Banquet (2006) and Aftershock (2010).
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 5 New Year film (He sui pian) refers to films, usually comedy films, designed to be released 
and exhibited specifically during the Chinese New Year Holiday. Feng’s 甲方乙方 / 
Party A, Party B (1997) is the first New Year film in mainland China and was the box-
office champion that year. It has now become a very popular genre in Chinese cinema.
 6 This response from some Chinese viewers is not difficult to understand, given the long-
lasting tensions and hostility between these two Asian neighbours resulting from the war 
between them 70 years ago and the prevailing tension over a set of disputed islands in 
the East China Sea.
 7 For example, on www.mtime.com, one of the major Chinese fan sites, on which, at 
the time of writing (July 2014), there are 1,833 reviews and 13,209 comments on this 
film. Individuals’ analyses of this film can also be found on various websites (e.g. www.
douban.com and twww.tieba.baidu.com) and personal blogs, e.g. ‘姜文的王朝永远不
会到来-《让子弹飞》的一些暗线、隐喻、野心和吹捧’ (Jiang Wen’s Dynasty Will 
Not Come: Hidden Clues, Metaphors, Ambition and Puffery in Let The Bullets Fly) 
by Xi Liu (user name) (http://movie.douban.com/review/4534425/); ‘此时此刻我
们去浦东—《让子弹飞》的隐喻’ (At this Moment, We Are Leaving for Pudong: 
Metaphors in Let The Bullets Fly) by Kidwell (user name) (http://movie.douban.
com/review/4545366/); ‘《让子弹飞》中的十大历史隐喻’ (The Ten Historical 
Metaphors in Let The Bullets Fly) by Jin Manlou (user name) (http://blog.ifeng.com/
article/9488478.html); and ‘《让子弹飞》的经典解读’ (The Classic Interpretation 
of Let The Bullets Fly) by aqssm (user name) (http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4809999_1.
html). Websites consulted 29 July 2014.
 8 E.g. ‘猜《子弹》’ (An Analysis of Let The Bullets Fly) by Du Junfei, http://blog.caijing.
com.cn/expert_article-151525-15099.shtml. Consulted 29 July 2014.
 9 ‘我要给所有人公平，有名无实的冤鼓，不能只是一个摆设，要让大家来鸣冤，
要给大家主持公道。’
10 ‘不准跪！皇上都没了，没人值得你们跪！我也不值得你们跪！我来鹅城只办三
件事。公平！公平！还是公平！’
11 ‘县长的儿子，吃了两碗粉却只给一碗的钱，这就是不公平，我们要公平，要
公平！’
12 State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television of the People’s Republic of China.
13 ‘姜的牛逼之处，在于这片毛粉见毛，美国粉见华盛顿，改良派见改良，革命派
见革命，民粹们见民粹，屁民见救世主，广电们见没有某党就没有新中国，各
派都喜闻乐见觉得替自己说了话。’
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